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 Abstract 
 
 
Using the Student Investment Fund at Claremont McKenna College as a proxy for 
inexperienced investors, I demonstrate that inexperienced investors using fundamental 
analysis produce momentum-like buying patterns. The results show that the Student 
Investment Fund is on average buying stocks that outperform Carhart’s four-factor asset 
pricing model in the year before purchase. As a result, the Student Investment Fund has, 
on average, underperformed the S&P500 by .48% per year since 1996. My thesis 
explores why the Student Investment Fund may have adopted momentum-like purchasing 
patterns and what steps can be taken to remedy it.  
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 1 
I. Introduction 
 Investing icons such as Benjamin Graham and his disciple, Warren Buffett, are 
two of the most influential figures in finance. Their success makes them legendary, but 
their simple investment approach makes them relatable. Both Graham and Buffett are 
major proponents of an investment strategy called fundamental analysis. The relative ease 
and accessibility of the strategy cause waves of new investors to try their hand at 
investing like Graham,1 employing fundamental analysis to ascertain the intrinsic value 
of securities.2  
Broadly speaking, fundamental analysis is the process of delving into the financial 
statements of a company, determining basic financial ratios, and identifying trends of key 
financial metrics to discover undervalued investments. The apparent simplicity of the 
strategy attracts newcomers interested in replicating their approach. Ignoring the 
vicissitudes of the market, Graham uses fundamental analysis to invest in heavily 
discounted assets, which often have severely depressed stock prices. Finding companies 
that are trading at significant discounts by scrutinizing public financial filings is the spirit 
of fundamental analysis.  
If it is as simple as analyzing financial filings and calculating basic accounting 
ratios, why can’t inexperienced investors make money like Graham? The answer to this 
                                                 
1 ---. Amazon: Editorial Reviews. Accessed November 17, 2016. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Graham. Benjamin Graham’s book, The 
Intelligent Investor: The Definitive Book on Value Investing, is often referred to as the 
value investor’s bible and has sold over a million copies. 
 
2 Myers, Daniel. "The 3 Most Timeless Investment Principles." Investopedia. 2007. 
Accessed November 30, 2016. 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/07/grahamprinciples.asp.  
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question, and the foundation of my thesis, is inexperienced investors, although applying 
the same investment methods, are not buying the same types of stocks that Graham 
selects for his investments. 
 To examine what stocks they are buying, I analyze the buying patterns of a 
student-run investment fund that exclusively invests using fundamental analysis. My 
findings show that the buying patterns of the fund resemble a basic momentum strategy. 
Instead of investing in clearly undervalued stocks like Graham, those with large 
differences between the stock price and its intrinsic value, the fund buys stocks that have 
performed well in recent past, betting they will perform better in the future. While it may 
be true that a stock with rising prices may still be undervalued, the likelihood of that 
occurrence is less compelling because the margin of error for the analysis is much 
smaller.  
Momentum is an investment strategy that seeks to capitalize on weak-form 
market inefficiency3 by using past prices to predict future prices. Pure momentum 
traders4 buy stocks that do well and sell stocks that do poorly over various periods of 
time. The idea behind this strategy is that each stock has inertia and thus high performers 
will continue to outperform (for a while) and losers continue to underperform (for a 
                                                 
3 Weak-form market efficiency claims that the current price of a stock reflects all past 
prices and thus technical analysis cannot be used to predict, and subsequently beat the 
market. Some argue that because momentum exists and generates profits, the weak-form 
market efficiency hypothesis is incorrect.  
 
4 I use the term “pure” to distinguish between investors who knowingly invest using 
momentum strategies and those that accidentally produce a rudimentary momentum 
result, such as the subjects of this study. 
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while). Thus, if I distill momentum investing into a simple idea, it is that investors buy 
winners (Jageedesh and Titman 1993).5  
The purpose of my thesis is twofold. First, I seek to fill the current gap in the 
literature. While many studies have examined fundamental analysis (see for example, Ou 
and Penman),6 momentum (see for example, Lo and MacKinlay 1989),7 and behavior of 
the inexperienced investor (see for example Greenwood and Nagel 2006),8 to the best of 
my knowledge no study exists that has examined the causal relationship between all 
three. Second, I posit why this relationship occurs and the implications that it has. It takes 
focused strategies that carry high amounts of risk to produce abnormal returns utilizing 
momentum.9 Even when professional traders explicitly use momentum, it is difficult 
                                                 
5 Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, and Sheridan Titman. "Returns to Buying Winners and Selling 
Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency." The Journal of Finance 48, no. 1 
(1993): 65. doi:10.2307/2328882. Per Jageedesh and Titman (1993), winners are stocks 
that had returns in the top decile. However, the classification of winners varies by 
strategy.  
 
6 Ou, Jane A., and Stephen H. Penman. "Financial Statement Analysis and the Prediction 
of Stock Returns." Journal of Accounting and Economics 11, no. 4 (1989): 295-329. 
doi:10.1016/0165-4101(89)90017-7. 
 
7 Lo, Andrew, and A. Craig MacKinlay. "When Are Contrarian Profits Due to Stock 
Market Overreaction?" Review of Financial Studies, 1989. doi:10.3386/w2977. 
 
8 Greenwood, Robin, and Stefan Nagel. "Inexperienced Investors and Bubbles." Journal 
of Financial Economics 93, no. 2, 239-58. Accessed December 2, 2016. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.08.004.  
 
9 Lowenstein, Roger. When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital 
Management. New York: Random House, 2000. As is the problem with all technically 
based investment strategies, they work when the statistical relationships between market 
forces hold. In the case of momentum, investors depend on past price patterns to predict 
future prices. The spectacular failures of such strategies are well-documented. For 
instance, a hedge fun utilizing mostly technical strategies called Long-Term Capital 
Management lost $4.6 billion in four months. 
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enough to produce abnormal returns.10 Doing so unwittingly makes it nearly impossible. 
Unsurprisingly, the SIF has underperformed the S&P500 index since 1996 (average 
annual return for the SPX was 7.60% compared to 7.12% for the SIF11). My thesis will 
expose, and explain why, rudimentary momentum masquerades as fundamental analysis 
among inexperienced investors.   
In this case study, I use the Student Investment Fund (SIF) at Claremont 
McKenna College (CMC)12 as a proxy for the inexperienced investor employing 
fundamental analysis. The SIF is a good choice for my analysis for the following reasons.  
First, according to the SIF’s website: 
The student investment fund practices ‘bottom-up' investing, using 
fundamental analysis of financial and economic information to identify 
mispriced securities. Students evaluate vital information including 
financial reports, industry comparisons, new regulations, demographic 
trends, earnings statements, and economy-wide trends to build discounted 
cash flow models and relative valuations to identify potentially mispriced 
securities.13  
 
                                                 
 
10 Kinnel, Russel. "Why Momentum Funds Don't Have Any." Morningstar. November 
29, 2010. Accessed December 2, 2016. 
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=361034. 
 
11 Returns are from the SIF’s trading data and Bloomberg. The difference between the 
SIF and SPX returns are insignificant at conventional levels.  
 
12 Henceforth referred to as “the SIF.” 
 
13 ---. "Our Investment Strategy." CMC Student Investment Fund. Accessed November 
28, 2016. http://www.cmcsif.org/index.php/about-us/our-investment-strategy. 
 
 5 
Secondly, even though the SIF is one of the largest student-run investment organizations 
in the country,14 its investors are students with very limited investing experience. The 
average age of an SIF member is 19 and average years of investing experience are less 
than two.   
I examine whether the SIF is buying winners based on Carhart's four-factor model 
(Carhart 1997)15 by using data from the SIF in conjunction with data from the Wharton 
Research Data Services (CRSP) database of stock returns,16 and Ken French’s database.17 
If the SIF is buying winners, I then determine how they win – are they loading up on the 
momentum factor or are they generating pure alpha, abnormal returns above Carhart's 
four-factor model? I find that the SIF has indeed invested in winners, but the momentum 
factor does not load. The average monthly alpha in the year before the SIF purchased a 
stock was 1%, amounting to annual abnormal returns of 12%, which is significant at the 
1% level. 
                                                 
14 The following information can be found within CMC SIF’s recent presentation called 
CMC SIF Advisory Board Presentation (9/30/2016). The SIF at CMC is one of the 
largest run student investment funds in the country, managing over $1.7 million in 
endowment assets. It is composed of over 45 students and overseen by 15 industry 
professionals, a faculty advisor, and the Chief Investment Officer (CIO) of CMC.  
 
15 Carhart, Mark M. "On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance." The Journal of 
Finance 52, no. 1 (1997): 57. doi:10.2307/2329556. 
 
16 ---. "Wharton Research Data Services." Wharton Research Data Services. Accessed 
November 28, 2016. https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/. 
 
17 French, Ken R. "Kenneth R. French - Data Library." Kenneth R. French - Data Library. 
Accessed November 28, 2016. 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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I organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing 
literature on fundamental analysis, momentum, and behavior of inexperienced investors. 
Sections 3 and 4 examine the data and my strategy and results, respectively. I present my 
conclusions in the final section.   
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II. Literature Review 
While there is a significant amount of literature on momentum, fundamental 
analysis, and the inexperienced investor, to the best of my knowledge there are no studies 
that seek to find a causal relationship between fundamental analysis and momentum for 
the inexperienced investor. As previously noted, the first purpose of my paper is to 
address the missing intersection between the three strands of literature.  Before I attempt 
to do this, I will discuss each strand of literature in turn.   
The first strand of literature focuses on momentum. Momentum is a trading 
strategy that capitalizes on the momentum of stocks that are performing well and those 
that are performing poorly, offering, as Eugene Fama put it, the “biggest embarrassment 
to the [efficiency market hypothesis].”18 Although investment professionals accept 
momentum strategies as legitimate,19 there is still debate regarding the source of the 
momentum profits.  
A popular view in academia, to the despair of Fama, is that momentum profits are 
a result of weak-form market inefficiency. Lo and MacKinlay (1989)20 investigate a 
                                                 
18 Asness, Clifford S. "AQR - Fama on Momentum." AQR - Fama on Momentum. 
February 5, 2016. Accessed November 29, 2016. https://www.aqr.com/cliffs-
perspective/fama-on-momentum. Eugene Fama conceived of the efficient market 
hypothesis. 
 
19 See footnote five above. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find that by buying certain 
stocks that had performed well in the past and selling stocks that had not performed well 
in the past, one could generate abnormal excess returns over 3-12 month periods. They 
argue that employing such strategies has become a distinct and popular trading strategy in 
the United States. 
 
20 See footnote seven above.  
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contrarian strategy of selling winners and buying losers. They find that weekly portfolio 
returns are positively autocorrelated and that returns of large capitalization stocks lead the 
returns of small capitalization stocks. As such, they argue that overreaction in the markets 
is the sole source of contrarian profits. Overreaction by investors would imply markets 
are inefficient since stock prices are either inflated or depressed based on sentiments, not 
based on facts about the stock. One could take advantage of this by merely analyzing past 
stock prices. 
Another study that sought to prove momentum was an indicator of market 
inefficiency was Bondt and Thaler (1985),21 who find that over long time horizons (three 
to five years), stocks that had performed poorly in the past outperformed those that had 
done well. Their main finding was that the market was weak-form inefficient; and, 
similar to Lo and MacKinlay’s (1989)22 conclusion, investors tend to overreact to bad 
news in a way that makes predicting future stock prices based on past stock prices 
possible. The procedure in Further, Grundy, and Martin (2001)23 illustrates that since 
1926, using momentum strategies-- buying recent winners and selling recent losers--
guarantees returns that are more profitable than those based on total returns. Chan, 
                                                 
21 Bondt, Werner F. M. De, and Richard Thaler. "Does the Stock Market Overreact?" The 
Journal of Finance 40, no. 3 (1985): 793-805. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05004.x.  
 
22 See footnote seven above.  
 
23 Further, Grundy, and J. Spencer Martin. "Understanding the Nature of the Risks and 
the Source of the Rewards to Momentum Investing." SSRN Electronic Journal SSRN 
Journal, 2001. doi:10.2139/ssrn.94049.  
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Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1995)24 try to explain the success of momentum strategies as 
a function of the market underreacting to current information. The results suggest that 
investors could generate significant returns using the stock’s prior six-month performance 
and most recent earning surprise over the next six months. Additionally, studies such as 
Barberis, Schleifer and Vishny (1997),25 Daniel, Hirshliefer, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998),26 and Hong and Stein (1999)27 find momentum profits are generated because of 
inherent biases in how investors process information. 
Despite the papers seeking to prove momentum profits are a result of capitalizing 
on market inefficiency, others try to prove momentum returns are simply compensation 
for hidden risk. Conrad and Kaul (1998),28 Lo and MacKinlay (1989),29 and Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993)30 all argue that when controlling for certain risks, excess returns from 
                                                 
24 Chan, Louis K., Narasimhan Jegadeesh, and Josef Lakonishok. "Momentum 
Strategies." The Journal of Finance, 1995. doi:10.3386/w5375.  
 
25 Barberis, Nicholas, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. "A Model of Investor 
Sentiment." Journal of Financial Economics, 1997. doi:10.3386/w5926.  
 
26 Daniel, Kent, David Hirshleifer, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. "Investor Psychology 
and Security Market Under- and Overreactions." The Journal of Finance 53, no. 6 (1998): 
1839-885. doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00077.  
 
27 Hong, Harrison, and Jeremy C. Stein. "A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum 
Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets." The Journal of Finance 54, no. 6 (1999): 
2143-184. doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00184.  
 
28 Conrad, Jennifer, and Gautam Kaul. "An Anatomy of Trading Strategies." Rev. Financ. 
Stud. Review of Financial Studies 11, no. 3 (1998): 489-519. doi:10.1093/rfs/11.3.489.  
 
29 See footnote seven above.   
 
30 See footnote five above.  
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momentum are explainable. Additionally, some thought momentum was not an anomaly 
or reward for risk-taking but a result of data mining. For instance, Levy (1967)31 finds 
that buying stocks at prices greater than their 27-week average lead to excess abnormal 
returns. However, a study by Jensen and Bennington (1970)32 questioned the results, 
arguing data mining33 was responsible for producing the result. Nevertheless, if 
momentum profits are simply a result of taking on additional risk, then its returns can be 
controlled for in an asset pricing model. Carhart (1997)34 creates a four-factor model that 
attempts to do just that, controlling for price momentum by using a momentum factor. 
Thus, Carhart's four-factor model is the benchmark I use in my analysis.   
Although the literature regarding momentum is well-developed, none posit that 
momentum can be achieved unwittingly through fundamental analysis. In other words, 
the literature has focused on its viability as a strategy and source of its profits. Although 
the purpose of the paper is to not explicitly take a side in this debate, because of my 
usage of Carhart's four-factor model, I implicitly assume it is a risk factor. My paper 
                                                 
31 Levy, Robert A. "Relative Strength As A Criterion For Investment Selection." The 
Journal of Finance 22, no. 4 (1967): 595-610. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb00295.x. 
 
32 Jensen, Michael C., and George A. Bennington. "Random Walks and Technical 
Theories: Some Additional Evidence." The Journal of Finance 25, no. 2 (1970): 469. 
doi:10.2307/2325495.  
 
33 Fama, Eugene F. "Efficient Capital Markets: II." The Journal of Finance 46, no. 5 
(1991): 1575. doi:10.2307/2328565. Data mining as described by Fama (1991): “With 
clever researchers on both sides of the efficiency fence, rummaging for forecasting 
variables, we are sure to find instances of ‘reliable’ return predictability that are in fact 
spurious.” Essentially, data mining finds returns by comparing pseudo-anomaly 
portfolios with real anomaly portfolios, finding false correlations.  
 
34 See footnote 15 above.  
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explores how an investor, attempting to utilize fundamental analysis to invest in 
undervalued companies, could produce a momentum-like result. 
The second strand of existing literature focuses on fundamental analysis and 
whether it can yield excess returns. It seems that no paper has investigated a causal 
relationship between fundamental analysis and momentum. Abarbanell and Bushee 
(1998)35 find that fundamental analysis of inventories, effective tax rates, audit 
qualifications, accounts receivable, gross margins, selling expenses, and other 
fundamental metrics yield an average 12-month cumulative size-adjusted abnormal 
return. Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek and Sloan (2001)36 show that fundamental analysis 
can be used by short-sellers to identify firms likely to exhibit lower expected future 
returns. Finally, Ou and Penman (1989)37 argue that fundamental analysis successfully 
identifies equity values that are not currently valued in the stock price. However in 
response, Greig (1992)38 re-examined Ou and Penman (1989)39 and found that once an 
investor controls for certain risk factors, there is no incremental predictive ability in an 
                                                 
35 Abarbanell, Jeffery S., and Brian J. Bushee. "Abnormal Returns to a Fundamental 
Analysis Strategy." SSRN Electronic Journal SSRN Journal, 1998. 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.40740.  
 
36 Dechow, Patricia M., Amy P. Hutton, Lisa K. Meulbroek, and Richard G. Sloan. 
"Short Interests, Fundamental Analysis, and Stock Returns." SSRN Electronic Journal 
SSRN Journal, 2001. doi:10.2139/ssrn.167154.  
 
37 See footnote six above.  
 
38 Greig, Anthony C. "Fundamental Analysis and Subsequent Stock Returns." Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 15, no. 2-3 (1992): 413-42. doi:10.1016/0165-
4101(92)90026-x. 
 
39 See footnote six above.  
 
 12 
earnings increase. In total, research regarding fundamental analysis as an investment 
strategy is well-developed, but its connection to momentum is left unanalyzed. 
Although relatively underdeveloped compared to the other two strands, the third 
strand of literature dissects various behavioral patterns of inexperienced investors. 
Greenwood and Nagel (2006)40 found younger investors were more likely to buy stocks 
at the peak of the Internet bubble as compared to older investors. They posit 
inexperienced investors are more influenced by sentiment. Further, Peterson (2002)41 
argues that inexperienced investors are more likely to succumb to behavioral impulses 
than experienced investors. Finally, Sorensen (2007)42 says experienced venture 
capitalists, investors that subsidize the creation and growth of start-up companies, are 
82% more likely to succeed on an investment than inexperienced investors. Overall, the 
body of literature on inexperienced investors suggests they are susceptible to market 
sentiments and their performance is worse than those with more experience.  
By arguing that momentum is an unintended consequence of fundamental 
analysis, my thesis seeks to marry the three strands of literature together in a novel way. 
My thesis will provide the opportunity for numerous other studies that explore questions 
including, but not limited to: does the type of fundamental analysis materially impact 
buying patterns? Does momentum, generated by fundamental analysis, actually produce 
                                                 
40 See footnote eight above.   
 
41 Peterson, Richard L. "Buy on the Rumor and Sell on the News." Risk Management, 
2006. doi:10.1016/b978-012088438-4.50030-7.  
 
42 Sorensen, Morten. "How Smart is Smart Money? A Two-Sided Matching Model of 
Venture Capital." 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01291.x. 
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abnormal returns? What type of momentum is generated by fundamental analysis? Does 
fundamental analysis-generated momentum outperform technical analysis-generated 
momentum? Does the relationship between fundamental analysis and momentum exist 
for experienced investors? My thesis will provide the starting point for a new area of 
investigation in financial literature.  
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III. Data 
I divided the data section into four parts: an overview of my data set, the structure 
of the data that makes my estimation possible, definitions of variables, and limitations of 
the data. 
I. Data set construction 
 
I form a custom data set from three different sources to do my analysis: CRSP 
database on stock returns, SIF’s trading records, and Ken French’s database. By 
combining the essential pieces from each data set, I create a custom data set that provides 
all the data needed to perform my analysis. Each independent data set is formed from 
reputable sources, and I did not construct any of the factors myself. The final custom data 
set includes 82 stocks. For each stock, the data, where available, extends 72 months 
before the buy date (see section III.II for more information).  
 
 
Table 1 
Complete data set  
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
      
Ticker 82 
    
Buydate 82 
    
date 4,705 
    
stock_Ret 4,705 0.0229 0.1450 -0.6203 1.8273 
rf 4,705 0.0020 0.0018 0.0 0.0056 
      
hml 4,705 0.0022 0.0327 -0.1125 0.1291 
smb 4,705 0.0025 0.0333 -0.1717 0.2208 
mktrf 4,705 0.0051 0.0472 -0.1723 0.1135 
mom 4,705 0.0033 0.0566 -0.3458 0.1838 
The complete data set is formed by combining SIF’s trading data, CRSP data, and Ken French’s data. All data is monthly 
besides Ticker and Buydate. 
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The statistic that stands out from a summary of the complete data set is the stock_Ret 
variable, which is the raw monthly return of a stock (see section III.III for more 
information). The average raw return per month was 2.29%. On an annualized basis, that 
is equal to a 27.48% return. In comparison, the excess return of the market was 6.12% on 
an annualized basis. So, in raw returns, without controlling for risks, the SIF is buying 
stocks that have done exceedingly well in the past. 
II.  Data set structure for estimation 
My estimation process requires two distinct, data intensive steps. First, calculation of 
the factor betas in the pre-event period and second, calculation of the alphas in the pre-
purchase period (see section IV for more information). To facilitate easier estimation, I 
broke up the complete data set into two data sets, one for the pre-event period and one for 
the pre-purchase period. The pre-event period data is a subset of the complete data set 
(see Table 1) and includes data from 72 months before a stock was purchased (or the 
earliest available data) up until 12 months before the buy date. It spans five years before 
the pre-purchase period.  
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Table 2 
Pre-event period data 
Variable          Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
      
Ticker 82 
    
Buydate 82 
    
date 3,787 
    
stock_Ret 3,787 0.0233 0.1435 -0.6203 1.8273 
rf 3,787 0.0021 0.0018 0.0 0.0056       
hml 3,787 0.0026 0.0330 -0.1125 0.1291 
smb 3,787 0.0027 0.0341 -0.1717 0.2208 
mktrf 3,787 0.0049 0.0474 -0.1723 0.1135 
mom 3,787 0.0032 0.0571 -0.3458 0.1838 
 
Note: Average length of pre-event period was only 46 months (3,787 / 82) for each stock.   
 
The pre-purchase period data is also a subset of the complete data set (see Table 
1) and includes data from 12 months before a stock was purchased up until the 
buy date. It spans one year before a stock was purchased. 
 
Table 3 
Pre-purchase period data 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
      
Ticker 82 
    
Buydate 82 
    
date 918 
    
stock_Ret 918 0.0215 0.1511 -0.6129 1.0533 
rf 918 0.0016 0.0018 0.0 0.0056       
hml 918 0.0007 0.0312 -0.1125 0.1291 
smb 918 0.0018 0.0297 -0.1717 0.2208 
mktrf 918 0.0061 0.0460 -0.1723 0.1135 
mom 918 0.0036 0.0543 -0.3458 0.1838 
 
Note: Average pre-purchase period was 11.2 months. However, when the regressions were run to estimate alpha, stocks 
without a complete pre-purchase period were dropped. 
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Figure 1 
 Visualization of complete data set 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is a graphical representation of the complete data set. It shows the complete data as a sum of its two component sub 
data sets, the pre-event period and the pre-purchase period.  
 
 
III. Variable definitions 
 
Buydate 
I pulled this variable from SIF’s trading data. It is the date at which the SIF asked 
the Chief Investment Officer (CIO) of CMC to purchase a stock. Usually, the stock was 
bought a few days later because SIF does not do the physical trading of securities 
themselves. Because they must wait for the CIO to approve and execute the transaction, 
there is a short delay between when the SIF ordered the stock and when the CIO bought 
it. For my analysis, the difference of a few days is insignificant. I chose to use the ordered 
date instead of the transacted date because that is the day the SIF would theoretically 
have bought if they were executing trades themselves.  
stock_Ret 
I pulled this variable from CRSP for each stock. It is defined as the change in the 
total value of an investment in a common stock over some period per dollar of initial 
 
  
 
Pre-event period 
𝑡72 months 𝑡12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 
Pre-purchase period 
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investment.43 For my purposes, it is a monthly return.44 Excess security return subtracts 
the risk-free rate from the stock_Ret (𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑅𝑒𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓). 
Benchmark variables 
The benchmark I use to evaluate whether certain stocks are generating abnormal 
returns is Carhart's four-factor model. Carhart (1997)45 created his model when he 
extended the Fama-French three-factor model, an asset pricing model that sought to 
explain the variability in stock prices based on three factors, to include a momentum 
factor. 
hml: 
Pulled from Ken French’s database, hml is the first of four factors used to 
calculate Carhart's four-factor benchmark. It measures the value factor, the 
company's price-to-book ratio. Over the long run, value stocks tend to outperform 
growth stocks. The hml factor seeks to explain if and how much of a stock's 
returns are attributable to a loading on value. See below for its construction. 46 
 
ℎ𝑚𝑙 =
1
2
(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) –  
                                        
1
2
(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)                        (1)                           
                                                 
43 See footnote 16 above. 
 
44 For instance, if the return of a stock in nominal dollars in month 𝑛 was $10, and in 
month 𝑛 + 1 the return was $11, the CRSP database would display a stock_Ret in month 
𝑛 + 1 of 10%. 
 
45 See footnote 15 above.  
 
46 See footnote 17 above. 
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smb: 
Pulled from Ken French’s website, the smb variable is the second 
factor in Carhart's four-factor model and seeks to explain security returns 
as a function of market capitalization. It measures the historical excess 
returns of small capitalization stocks over large capitalization stocks.47 
 
𝑠𝑚𝑏 =
1
3
(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) −
                                       
1
3
(𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)      (2) 
 
 
mktrf: 
Also pulled from Ken French’s website, mktrf is the market risk 
premium, which is the difference in the market return and the risk-free rate 
(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓), and the third factor in Carhart's four-factor model. Ken French 
utilizes a multitude of US stock index returns found within CRSP to form 
the overall market return.48 As for the risk-free rate, French utilizes the 
one-month US Treasury bill rate, sourced from Ibbotson Associates, a 
private company that provides research and services to financial services 
companies. By taking the difference in the market returns and the risk-free 
                                                 
47 See footnote 17 above. 
 
48 Includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. 
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rate, the mktrf factor seeks to explain the sensitivity of a stock to the 
market.49 
 
mom: 
The fourth and final factor, called mom, is the momentum factor. 
By attempting to control for price momentum, the asset pricing model 
switches from a Fama French three-factor model to a Carhart four-factor 
model. The momentum factor simulates a strategy wherein the highest 
performing stocks over the past 12 months are bought and the worst 
performing stocks over the past 12 months are sold short.50 The 
momentum factor is constructed by taking the average returns from the 
prior month of high performing small and large capitalization portfolios 
and subtracting the average returns from the prior month of low-
performing small and large capitalization portfolios. A significant loading, 
or a significant regression coefficient on the mom factor, would indicate a 
price momentum stock, or that price momentum can partially explain a 
stock's returns.51  
 
                                                 
49 See footnote 17 above. 
 
50 Lee, Samuel. "Understanding Factor Models." Morningstar. February 26, 2014. 
Accessed November 13, 2016. 
http://ibd.morningstar.com/article/article.asp?id=636847&CN=brf295,http://ibd.mornings
tar.com/archive/archive.asp?inputs=days=14;frmtId=12, brf295. 
 
51 See footnote 17 above. 
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 𝑚𝑜𝑚 =
1
2
(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ) −
1
2
(𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 𝐵𝑖𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑤)            
             (3) 
 
 
IV.  Data set limitations 
 
Despite the advantages of the complete data set (see section III.I), there are several 
limitations worth discussing. First, because of various issues with the data, I had to 
reduce the sample size. There were originally 276 buy orders in SIF’s trading data since 
1996 when CMC began to track trades. 85 of the 276 buy orders were purchases of 
exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Historically, the SIF has not purchased ETFs directly. 
Instead, it uses them to invest excess cash from the selling of positions in other stocks. 
Since buying these ETFs was not a decision that was a result of fundamental analysis but 
rather an organizational decision, I removed them from the sample. Additionally, of the 
total 276 buy orders, 71 companies were bought multiple times. I removed the additional 
purchases of these stocks from my sample, considering only first-time purchases to avoid 
corrupting the pre-event period beta estimation. Therefore, by only looking at company 
stocks purchased once and  removing ETF purchases, the sample size was reduced to 120 
stocks.52 Next, I removed 38 stocks because there was no data for them in CRSP. After a 
company is either bought by another company (due to an acquisition or merger), taken 
private (bought by a financial sponsor), or gone bankrupt, CRSP removes them from the 
database. The final complete data set has 82 stocks. 
                                                 
52 15 of the 120 stocks had multiple sell dates, meaning the SIF sold them off in 
increments. I kept them in the sample because I am only analyzing the buying patterns of 
the fund. 
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In addition to being required to work with a smaller sample size, there are not 72 
observations for each stock. The average was only 58 months’ worth of observations per 
stock. The reason for CRSP not having 72 observations for each stock is that some 
companies did not exist a full 72 months before the purchase date. Unfortunately, this 
means that the pre-event period was not a full 60 months for every stock (see Table 2 for 
more information), which reduces the precision of the beta estimates. In turn, this could 
negatively impact the precision of the alpha calculations in the pre-purchase period.  
Thirdly, for 80 individual monthly observations, CRSP gave two different returns. 
Because there are 4,705 total observations, the duplicates made up only 1.7% of the data 
set. Since the duplicate observations were not concentrated within any one stock, and to 
err on the conservative side, I dropped the higher of the duplicate observations.  
Finally, by using Ken French’s data, I did not create the factor returns myself. In 
the next section, I will use the data described to test my hypothesis. 
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IV. Estimation and Results 
To ascertain whether the stocks that the SIF buys outperform Carhart's four-factor 
benchmark in the pre-purchase period and, if so, whether they are price momentum 
stocks, I first calculate the difference between an individual stock’s return in the pre-
purchase period and the benchmark return in the pre-purchase period. The difference is 
abnormal return, or alpha, because it is not explained by an asset pricing model or 
benchmark. The existence of cumulative alpha over the course of the fund’s buying 
history determines if the fund is buying of winners.  
The first step in calculating alpha is determining the factor loadings, or 
benchmark regression coefficients, in the pre-event period. Using a span of five years 
provides a large enough sample to determine what each stock’s beta, or regression 
coefficient, should be. To calculate the betas for each factor, I run a linear regression of 
the excess returns of each stock onto the four-factor returns during the pre-event period. 
 
 
𝐸𝑆𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡 +   𝐵ℎ𝑚𝑙ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑡  +  𝐵𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑡  +  𝐵𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡 +   𝐵𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑡 +
                𝜀𝑡                                                            (4)                   
 
where 𝐸𝑆𝑅𝑡 is excess security return and 𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡, 𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑡, ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑡, 𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑡 are the 
respective factor returns for month 𝑡. 
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Table 4 
Summary of regression coefficients 
Coefficient Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
     
Ticker 
    
hml -0.2620 1.4149 -2.5790 7.6354 
smb** 0.5752 1.2344 -3.8350 3.3841 
mktrf** 1.1809 1.0389 -3.0920 4.8463 
mom -0.1060 1.1870 -2.4170 7.5184 
     
Obs. 73    
** p < .001 
This table represents the summary statistics for the results of 73 regressions. For instance, for any given stock in the pre-
event period, on average the beta for the size factor is .57. 
Note: Due to a lack of data, betas could not be calculated for nine stocks. Thus, I dropped the nine stocks and ran 73 
regressions. 
 
Overall, only 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓 and  𝛽𝑠𝑚𝑏, on average, are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. The regression coefficient results demonstrate that the stocks the SIF 
invested in loaded on 𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓 and 𝑠𝑚𝑏. In monthly terms, a significant positive loading 
on 𝑠𝑚𝑏 means that for each percentage point a small capitalization stock beat a large 
capitalization stock, the predicted return for an SIF stock rose by .57%, all other factors 
remaining constant. Similarly, a positive loading on the 𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓 factor shows that SIF 
tended to invest in high market beta stocks. On average, if the market rose one percentage 
point, the predicted return for an SIF stock rose by about 1.2%.  
The regression coefficients reveal that SIF's investment portfolio in the pre-event 
period tilts towards small capitalization, high market beta stocks, with little exposure to 
growth or price momentum stocks. In fact, only six stocks had positive and significant 
momentum factors. Although the stocks do not load on price momentum in the pre-event 
period, the first part of my hypothesis is unaffected. Rather, the insignificant loading 
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indicates the SIF is not buying stocks sensitive to price momentum. Put another way, 
price momentum does not explain the abnormal returns. This means the SIF is not buying 
price momentum stocks but still could be buying winners overall. 
 Next, using the estimated betas, I calculate the monthly ?̂?𝑖 for each stock in the pre-
purchase period as follows:  
 ?̂?𝑖 = 𝐸𝑆𝑅𝑡 −  (𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑡 ∗ 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓) −  (𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑡 ∗ 𝛽𝑠𝑚𝑏) − (ℎ𝑚𝑙𝑡 ∗ 𝛽ℎ𝑚𝑙) − (𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑡 ∗
                       𝛽𝑚𝑜𝑚)                     (5) 
where 𝐵ℎ𝑚𝑙, 𝐵𝑠𝑚𝑏, 𝐵𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑟𝑓, and  𝐵𝑚𝑜𝑚 are the value, size, market premium, and 
momentum regression coefficients and all other variables are as previously 
defined. 
 
Next, I calculate the cumulative abnormal return for each stock (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘) by adding up 
each monthly ?̂?𝑖 for each stock.  
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 =  ∑ ?̂?𝑖
12
𝑖=1                    (6)        
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Table 5 
Summary of 𝐂𝐀𝐑𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐜𝐤 
CARstock 
Mean 0.1197 
Standard Error 0.0961 
Median 0.1209 
Standard Deviation 0.8208 
Minimum -4.578 
Maximum 2.6653 
Count 73 
 Note: The standard error in this chart is not the one used in the t-statistic test. See below for more information. 
 
 
Table 5 reveals that by taking an average of all the 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘, I find the 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is equal to 
~12%. In other words, on average, any stock that SIF purchased outperformed Carhart's 
four-factor benchmark by 12% over the previous 12 months. To prove the 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is 
significant, I also calculate the standard error. To do so, I calculate the 𝜎𝑖 for each stock 
using stock returns during the pre-event period, 𝜎𝐶𝐴𝑅 , and 𝜎𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   as follows: 
 
  𝜎𝐶𝐴𝑅 =  √12 ×  𝜎𝑖                                                                 (7)        
 𝜎𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  = (
√12
73
)√∑ 𝜎𝑖 2
73
𝑖=1                (8)        
Once I calculate the 𝜎𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  , I perform a t-test to ascertain the statistical likelihood that the 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is significantly different from zero. In particular, I calculate the t-statistic using the 
following equation: 
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 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =  
?̅?−𝑢0
𝑠 / √𝑛
               (9) 
where ?̅? is 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑢0 is zero, 𝑠 is 𝜎𝐶𝐴𝑅 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ , and √𝑛 is the square root of the number of 
observations.  
 
The 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  for all the stocks in the sample is .1197 or ~12%. The 𝜎𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is .2177 or 
21.8%. The null hypothesis of the statistical hypothesis is that the 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is equal to zero. 
To reject the null hypothesis, I run the t-test below. 
 
 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =  
(𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  −0)
𝜎𝐶𝐴𝑅 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ / √73
=
(.1197 −0)
.2177/√73
= 4.7                 (10)  
The t-statistic is equal to 4.7, which is significant at the .01% level.53 As such, I reject the 
null hypothesis; the 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is statistically different from zero, which means that the SIF is 
buying winners. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 Gerstman, Burt B. "StatPrimer (Version 7.0)." StatPrimer (Version 7.0). Accessed 
November 15, 2016. http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/gerstman/StatPrimer.  
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V. Conclusion 
Fundamental analysis is a particularly attractive investing strategy for investors. 
Its relative simplicity makes it accessible by allowing even inexperienced investors to 
employ it. However, when inexperienced investors do so, they produce an unintended 
momentum-like pattern, often leaving money on the table. 
The primary purpose of my thesis is to demonstrate that the fundamental analysis 
inexperienced investors use may, in fact, produce a momentum-based trading pattern that 
fails to capture undervalued stocks with the potential to generate excess returns over the 
long term. I use the Student Investment Fund (SIF) at Claremont McKenna College 
(CMC) as a proxy for inexperienced investors, analyze the buying patterns of the fund, 
and determine if they roughly follow a rudimentary momentum strategy of buying 
winners.54 My findings show that this is precisely what occurs. On average from 1996 to 
2015, the stocks the SIF purchased had statistically significant annual abnormal returns of 
12%. Although the insignificance of the momentum factor in the pre-event period means 
that the abnormal returns are not attributable to price momentum, it does prove for the 
SIF that their fundamental analysis investing results in buying winners.55  
The secondary purpose of my thesis is to explain why this relationship exists. 
Fundamental analysis relies on making intrinsic value calculations based on a deep 
understanding of the firm's current and expected future condition through critical analysis 
                                                 
54 Winners were defined as stocks with abnormal returns above Carhart’s four factor 
model in the year before purchase. 
 
55 Reminder: winners are defined as stocks that have produced abnormal returns in the 
pre-event period. They are not necessarily stocks that continue to outperform past the buy 
date. 
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of a company's financial statements. The valuation is linked directly to its accounting 
numbers and other financials. A firm with good accounting numbers or trends has a high 
projected intrinsic value and is the type of firm likely to be invested in by an 
inexperienced investor employing fundamental analysis. Since stock prices are leading 
indicators, stock prices will increase in anticipation of good accounting numbers, which 
makes it difficult for fundamental analysis to get in front of the market. When a 
fundamental analysis investor views the numbers, he or she will be viewing old data. The 
stock will have already reacted to any good numbers or trends by the time of the 
investment. Thus, by investing using fundamental analysis, inexperienced investors may 
unwittingly be buying stocks that have done well in the recent past, reflecting 
rudimentary momentum. While it may be true that a stock with a rising price could still 
be undervalued, the likelihood of that occurrence is less compelling because the margin 
for error in that circumstance is much smaller. Investors like Graham and Buffett differ 
from traditional investors because they add another condition to focus their analyses. 
They invest according to a margin of safety, requiring at least a 50% discount on the 
stock price to its intrinsic value.56 This significant margin sensitizes their assumptions 
and assures, even with inaccurate intrinsic value calculations, that the investment will 
make money. In contrast to the SIF, the significant margin of safety will ensure that most 
of the time investments are not in stocks that have significantly outperformed in the 
recent past. The SIF, despite their inexperience and consequently inaccurate intrinsic 
value calculations, has a much smaller margin of safety than Graham.    
                                                 
56 See footnote one above.  
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Aside from lagging the stock price, the time constraints students face could 
amplify the relationship between fundamental analysis and selecting winners. A student 
participates in the SIF as an extra-curricular activity and thus does not have the time to 
research enough companies to evaluate which stocks are trading at significant discounts. 
They instead choose to analyze companies they know about or find a company that has 
been in the news. For instance, recent evidence suggests that stocks in the news are more 
likely to be traded. Engelberg and Parsons (2011)57 argue that an increase in press 
coverage strongly predicts an increase in trading volume and Fang, Peress, and Zheng 
(2014)58 find that stocks receiving media coverage are bought more heavily by mutual 
funds. Using the news as a screening tool, students in the SIF narrow the universe of 
stocks to invest in, applying fundamental analysis to already well-known stocks. Lin 
(2011)59 finds that the more media coverage a stock receives, the more it outperforms its 
peers that do not receive media attention. If the SIF does utilize the news as a screen to 
which they apply fundamental analysis, it could explain why the SIF buys winners and 
not Graham’s margin of safety stocks.  
                                                 
57 Engelberg, Joseph E., and Christopher A. Parsons. "The Causal Impact of Media in 
Financial Markets." The Journal of Finance 66, no. 1 (2011): 67-97. doi:10.1111/j.1540-
6261.2010.01626.x.  
 
58 Fang, Lily H., Joel Peress, and Lu Zheng. "Does Media Coverage of Stocks Affect 
Mutual Funds' Trading and Performance?" Review of Financial Studies 27, no. 12 (2014): 
3441-466. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhu056.  
 
59 Lin, Shengle. "Stock Return and Financial Media Coverage Bias." October 2011. 
Accessed November 30, 2016. 
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/groups/finance/Lin_JobMktPaper.pdf.  
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The implications of my findings are important to understanding the shortcomings 
of fundamental analysis. Although tempting to use stocks in the news, it is likely that 
they have already performed well, and thus the upside of investing in them as 
undervalued assets is diminished. Achieving the same level of success as Graham and 
Buffet is difficult, but it is nearly impossible if you ignore a central and often overlooked 
tenet of fundamental analysis: it is harder to find a good deal if the price has already 
risen. My advice to the aspiring investor based on the results of this thesis would be to 
use fundamental analysis like Graham and not like the SIF: employ fundamental analysis 
to find stocks with severely depressed stock prices and a large margin of safety. The more 
inexperienced one is, the larger the margin of safety should be to compensate for the 
inaccuracy of the valuation. Indeed, the SIF has failed to duplicate Graham's 17% 
average annual return from 1934 to 195660 and Buffet's 20% average annual over the past 
50 years.61 Its average annual return since 1996 is 7.12%, underperforming the market by 
.48%. By buying winners, the SIF is probably buying fully valued firms, and thus it 
exposes itself to a random walk. Finding such severely undervalued companies like 
Graham is tough, or else everyone would do it. So, in the future, the SIF should consider 
remaining more passively invested and spending more time on due diligence for each 
individual investment idea. Assuming students do not wait until the last minute to find a 
                                                 
60 Loth, Richard. “The Greatest Investors: Benjamin Graham.” Investopedia. Accessed 
December 4, 2016. 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/greatest/benjamingraham.asp. 
 
61 Sommer, Jeff. “Warren Buffett’s Awesome Feat at Berkshire Hathaway, Revisited.” 
New York Times. March 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/your-
money/warren-buffetts-awesome-feat-at-berkshire-hathaway-revisited.html?_r=0. 
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company to pitch, a more passively managed fund would alleviate the time constraint 
problem students have and increase the chances of finding a company Graham might 
invest in.   
There is much potential future research on the topic. For instance, a similar 
analysis on the SIF or an equivalent organization should be completed and include a 
detailed audit of how students sourced each investment idea to further distinguish the 
difference between Graham's and the inexperienced investor's fundamental analysis. 
Additionally, the analysis should be performed on professional funds that use 
fundamental analysis to see if the effect persists. Third, given what we now know about 
the SIF, its investment strategy, and its resulting trading pattern, investigating the specific 
conditions of the SIF that could amplify the momentum effect could yield interesting 
insights. While time constraints certainly limit a student's ability to performed detailed 
due diligence, other factors could also influence a student's success with employing 
fundamental analysis. For instance, do students feel pressure to pitch stocks that have 
recently performed well because people do not like pitching losers? Is risk-aversion 
preventing students from investing in beaten down securities? 
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